Abstract. When attacking a distributed protocol, an adaptive adversary may determine its actions (e.g., which parties to corrupt), at any time, based on its entire view of the protocol including the entire communication history. In this paper we are concerned with proactive RSA protocols, i.e., robust distributed RSA protocols that rerandomize key shares at certain intervals to reduce the threat of long-term attacks. Here we design the first proactive RSA system that is secure against an adaptive adversaries. The system achieves "optimal-resilience" and "secure space scalability" (namely O(1) keys per user).
Introduction
Distributed public-key systems involve public/secret key pairs where the secret key is distributively held by some number of servers. As long as an adversary cannot corrupt a quorum of servers the system remains secure (as opposed to centralized cryptosystems in which the compromise of a single entity breaks the system). Distributed cryptography, including the design of practical distributed cryptosystems, has been an area of extensive research (see surveys [9, 23, 21] ).
In this paper, we present the first proactive RSA system that is both optimally resilient and provably secure against an adaptive adversary. The system is also scalable in that it only requires a number of key shares that is linear in the number of servers. Let us review why such a proactive RSA system is considered one of the hardest amongst the "distributed cryptosystems" problems:
3. For l denoting the number of servers and t the number of misbehaving servers, an "optimally resilient" protocol is the weakest possible constraint, of l ≥ 2t + 1, (matching the trivial lower bound). 4. The size of keying information per server is an important parameter in determining scalability of a system. For "scalability of secure space," we require each server to store O(1) key shares, which is optimal. 5. The security proof for distributed protocols is usually based on simulating the adversary's view of the protocol. From the point of view of "proving security" against an adaptive adversary using simulatability is the most difficult one because the view of an adaptive adversary changes dynamically based on all information it receives.
Formally, what we show is:
There exists an adaptively-secure optimal-resilient space-scalable proactive RSA system.
Background
The "adaptive adversary" challenge: Let us elaborate more on the problem facing the designers of adaptively-secure distributed protocols. (Very few such systems have been designed e.g., [1, 2] ). The major difficulty in proving the security of protocols against adaptive adversaries is being able to efficiently simulate (without actually knowing the secret keys) the view of an adversary which may corrupt parties dynamically, depending on its internal "unknown strategy." The adversary's corruption strategy may be based on values of public ciphertexts, other public cryptographic values in the protocol, and the internal states of previously corrupted parties. Let a user's share of the private key be committed by any public value which is based on the share. The commitment may be an encryption of the share, or the computation to generate the signature with the quorum. Suppose the adversary decides to corrupt next the party whose identity matches a one-way hash function applied to the entire communication history of the protocol so far. Now we must simulate the corruption which allows obtaining a share of the key which is consistent with the commitments. In distributed public-key systems, the problem of adaptive security is exacerbated by the fact that there is generally "public function and related publicly-committed robustness information" available to anyone, which as discussed above, needs to be consistent with internal states of parties that get corrupted. This is the main cause of difficulties in the proof of security. With proactive systems the update has to be done correctly and be connected to the past, which is another source of difficulty when facing an adaptive adversary.
History of proactive RSA:
The work of [24] developed tools to allow proactive security [28] in discrete-log based systems. They also defined the notion of a proactive public-key system. Tools to allow proactive security in RSA-based systems were given in [16, 15, 30] .
(Previous work on threshold and robust threshold RSA systems is given in [10, 8, 17, 22] .) None of these tools have been shown to be secure against an adaptive adversary. Recently the notion of security against adaptive adversaries in threshold public-key systems was dealt with (in systems less constrained than ours) [19, 3] .
Our Contributions and Techniques:
We base our system on the one in [15] , since it is optimally resilient, and, as opposed to [16, 30] , is secure-space scalable (requires only a linear number of RSA key shares). The system in [30] needs O(l 3 ) RSA key shares. The system in [16] is suitable for small number of participants, but it is not optimally resilient, and may employ an even larger number of keys as the system grows in scale. Our system differs from the one in [15] in that we construct and employ a new set of techniques that make the system secure against an adaptive adversary.
As in previous proactive RSA systems, we perform secret sharing operations over the integers (since for security the order of the group containing the secret key cannot be revealed to the servers). A difficulty with integer operations is maintaining bounded share sizes even after many proactive update (rerandomization) operations. We do this without requiring any zero-knowledge proofs in our update protocol. In fact, we only use zero-knowledge proofs in our function application (signature) protocol, and if one wishes to optimize the system for the corruption-free case, these proofs would only need to be performed if the computed signature is found to be invalid (which is the typical "optimistic" approach to fault-tolerance advocated e.g. in [16] ).
Since we must maintain security against an adaptive adversary, we are not able to use Feldman's verifiable secret sharing VSS [14] , which is inherently insecure against an adaptive adversary. (Previous protocols, such as [15, 30] are based on Feldman VSS, and [30] uses it in particular to avoid the use of zeroknowledge proofs and thus increase some of the efficiency.) Instead, we use a form of Pedersen's VSS [29] . One can think of the commitments in this VSS as "detached commitments". These commitments are used to ensure correct behavior of servers, yet have no "hard attachment" to the rest of the system, even the secret key itself! We show how to work with these detached commitments, e.g., using "function representation transformations" like "poly-to-sum" and "sum-to-poly" (which are basic tools which maintain space-scalability and which we build based on [15] ). We also show how to maintain robustness by constructing simulatable "soft attachments" from these detached commitments into the operations of the rest of the system. The soft attachments are constructed using efficient zero-knowledge proofs-of-knowledge. For proactive maintenance we develop update techniques that carefully assure correctness of update, as well as non-growth of the key size as we perform our computations over the integers.
The basic proof technique for security against an adaptive adversary is based on the notion of a "faking server" which is chosen when commitments related to the secret key must be generated. (Fortunately, this is only during a function application phase, where additive sharings are used.) The simulator exploits the "actions" of this server to assure that the view is simulatable while not knowing the secret key. This server is chosen at random and its public actions are indistinguishable from an honest server to the adversary. We have to backtrack the simulation only if the adversary corrupts this special server. Since there is only one faking server, and since regardless of its corruption strategy, the adversary has a polynomial chance (at least 1/(t + 1)) of not corrupting this one server, we will be able to complete the simulation in expected polynomial time. We have to assure that this "faking server" technique works in the proactive setting, where the adversary is not just adaptive, but also mobile. Our protocol and simulation techniques also maintain "optimal resilience."
Model and Definitions

Participants and Communication:
We use the standard model for proactive systems [28] . The system consists of l servers S = {S 1 , . . . , S l }. A server is corrupted if it is controlled by the adversary. When corrupted, we assume "for security" that the adversary sees all the information currently on that server. On the other hand, the system should not "open" secrets of unavailable servers (effectively reducing the needed threshold). Namely, we separate availability faults from security faults (and do not cause potential security exposures due to unavailability). Our communication model is similar to [25] . All participants communicate via an authenticated bulletin board in a synchronized manner. We assume that the adversary cannot jam communication.
Time periods:
To deal with a mobile adversary, we assume a common global clock (e.g., a day, a week, etc.) that divides time into two types of time periods repeated in sequence: an update period (odd times) and an operational period (even times). During an operational period, the servers can perform functions using the current secret key shares. During the update period the servers engage in an interactive update protocol which upon completion the servers hold new shares to be used during the following operational period 1 . System Management: We assume that a server that is determined to be corrupted by a majority of active servers can be refreshed (i.e., erased and rebooted, or perhaps replaced by a new server with a blank memory) by some underlying system management. This is a necessary assumption for dealing with corrupted servers in any proactive system.
The adversary:
The adversary is t-restricted; namely it can, during each period, corrupt at most t servers, under the assumption that if a server is corrupt during an update period it is corrupt in the prior and subsequent operational periods.
A mobile adversary moves around as servers become corrupted or uncorrupted.
The actions of an adversary at any time may include submitting messages to the system to be signed, corrupting servers, and broadcasting arbitrary information on the communication channel. The adversary is adaptive; namely it is allowed to base its actions not only on previous function outputs, but on all the information that it has previously obtained.
Distributed Public-Key Systems:
Here we formally define our notions of security and robustness for proactive public-key systems. For simplicity, we will assume that the function application operation computes signatures. Remark: The choice of the inputs to the signing protocol prior to the challenge m defines the tampering power of the adversary (i.e., "known message," "chosen message", "random message" attacks). The choice depends on the implementation within which the distributed system is embedded. In this work, we assume that the (centralized) cryptographic function is secure with respect to the tampering power of the adversary. We note that the provably secure signature and encryption schemes typically activate the cryptographic function on random values (decoupled from the message choice of the adversary).
Definition 1. (Robustness of a Proactive System) A (t, l)-proactive publickey system S is robust if for any polynomial-time t-restricted
Range Notation
We will use the following notation to define ranges: 
Basics for Our System
Let k be the security parameter. Let key generator GE define a family of RSA functions to be (e, d, N ) ← GE(1 k ) such that N is a composite number N = P * Q where P, Q are prime numbers of k/2 bits each. The exponent e and modulus N are made public while d ≡ e −1 mod λ(N ) is kept private. 2 The RSA encryption function is public, defined for each message M ∈ Z N as: 
Recall that the RSA assumption implies the intractability of factoring products of two large primes.
Next we describe variants of Shamir secret sharing and Pedersen VSS that we use. They differ in that operations on the shares are performed over the integers, instead of in a modular subgroup of integers. 
(t,l)-Unconditionally-Secure VSS over the Integers (INT-(t,l)-US-VSS):
This primitive is based on Pedersen Unconditionally-Secure (t, l)-VSS [29] , and is slightly different than the version in [20] . Let N be an RSA modulus and let g and h be maximal order elements whose discrete log modulo N with respect to each other is unknown. The protocol begins with two (t, l)-secret sharings over the integers with β = N , the first sharing secret s ∈ [0, K], and the second sharing
a j x j be the random polynomial used in 2 λ(N ) = lcm(P − 1, Q − 1) is the smallest integer such that x λ(N) ≡ 1 mod N for any x ∈ Z * N . We use λ(N ), rather than more traditionally φ(N ), because it explicitly describes an element of maximal order in Z * N . 3 We note that L 2 s is actually the secret component of the secret key, which when added to a public leftover component (in [0, L 2 − 1]), forms the RSA secret key. 4 These tests only verify the shares are of the correct form, not that they are correct polynomial shares.
sharing s and let a (x) = . Say s and s are the shares computed using Lagrange interpolation from a set of t+1 shares that passed the verification step. If the dealer can reveal different secretsŝ andŝ that also correspond to the zero coefficient verification share, then the dealer can compute an α and β such that g α ≡ h β , which implies factoring (and thus breaking the RSA assumption). Looking ahead, we will need to simulate an INT-(t, l)-US-VSS. We can do this by constructing a random polynomial over an appropriate simulated secret (e.g., a random secret, or a secret obtained as a result of a previously simulated protocol) in the zero coefficient, and a random companion polynomial with a totally random zero coefficient.
Techniques
In order to "detach" ciphertexts from their cleartext values we employ semantically-secure non-committing encryption [1] . In fact, our (full) security proofs first assume perfectly secret channels and then add the above (a step we omit here).
A more involved issue concerns the public commitments. The collection of techniques needed to underly distributed public-key systems include: distributed representation methods (polynomial sharing, sum (additive) sharing), representation transformers which move between different ways to represent a function (poly-to-sum, sum-to-poly), as well as a set of "elementary" distributed operations (add, multiply, invert). For example, the "poly-to-sum" protocol is executed by t+1 servers at a time, and transforms a (t, l)-secure polynomial-based sharing to an additive sharing with t + 1 shares. We need to have such techniques (motivated by [20, 15] ) which are secure and robust against adaptive adversaries. We will rely on new zero-knowledge proof techniques (see Appendix A), as well as on shared representation of secrets as explained in Section 4. The notation "2poly" refers to a polynomial and its companion polynomial shared with INT-(t, l)-US-VSS (which is "unconditionally secure VSS"). The notation "2sum" refers to two additive sharings, with check shares that contain both additive shares of a server (similar to the check shares in INT-(t, l)-US-VSS). In describing the protocols, unless otherwise noted we will assume multiplication is performed mod N and addition (of exponents) is performed over the integers (i.e., not "mod" anything).
We define the following ranges, using the notation described in Section 3.1.
Let [Range
. 5 We implicitly assume all verification operations are performed in Z * N .
4 ] = (t + 1) · [Range 2 ] + (t + 1) · [0, L 2 ] + [Range 3 ] and [Range 4 ] = (t + 1) · [Range 2 ] + (t + 1) · [0, L 2 ] + [Range 3 ]. 5. Let [Range 5 ] = L · [Range 4 ] − (t + 1) · [0, L 2 N 2 /(t + 1)] and [Range 5 ] = L · [Range 4 ] − (t + 1) · [0, L 2 N 5 ].
2poly-to-2sum
The goal of 2poly-to-2sum (Figure 1 ) is to transform t-degree polynomials a() and a () used in INT-(t, l)-US-VSS into t + 1 additive shares for each secret a(0) and a (0), with corresponding check shares. The idea is to perform interpolation. 6 We note that in Step 2 each s i and s i is a multiple of L, so S i can actually compute b i and b i over the integers.
Initial configuration: INT-(t, l)-US-VSS (parameters: (N, g, h)
) with tdegree polynomials a() and a (), and a set Λ of t + 1 server indices. For all i ∈ Λ, recall Si holds shares si and s i with corresponding check share
For all i ∈ Λ, Si computes the additive shares bi = sizi,Λ and b
i = s i zi,Λ and publishes Bi = g b i h b i = A z i,Λ i .
All servers verify Bi for all
. If the verification for a given Bi fails, each server broadcasts a (Bad,i) message and quits the protocol. 
2sum-to-2sum
The goal of 2sum-to-2sum is to randomize additive dual-shares (most likely obtained from a 2poly-to-2sum) and update the corresponding check shares. The scheme is in Figure 2 . Note the following ranges: 
3. For all i ∈ Λ, Si publishes ri, * = bi − j∈Λ ri,j and r i, * = b i − j∈Λ r i,j . 4. For all i ∈ Λ, Si privately transmits ri,j and r i,j to all Sj for j ∈ Λ \ {i}. 5. For all i ∈ Λ, Si publishes Ri,j = g r i,j h r i,j for j ∈ Λ \ {i}. 
All servers can compute
Ri,i = Bi/g r i, * h r i, * j∈Λ\{i} Ri,j for all i ∈ Λ. 7. For all j ∈ Λ, Sj verifies that each ri,j ∈ Z L 2 N 2 /(t+1) , each r i,j ∈ Z L 2 N 4 , each ri, * ∈ [Range5], each r i, * ∈ [Range 5 ],and that Ri,j ≡ g r i,j h r i,j . If the verification fails, Sj broadcasts an (Accuse,i,j) message, to which Si responds by broadcasting ri,j and r i,j . If Si does not respond, ri,j or r i,j is not in the correct range, or Ri,j ≡ g r i,j h r
2sum-to-1sum
2sum-to-1sum (Figure 3 ) is employed in computing partial signatures using the first parts of the additive dual-shares (obtained from 2sum-to-2sum) as the exponents, and in proving the partial signatures correct. These proofs form the "soft attachments" from the information-theoretically secure check shares to the computationally secure check shares that must correspond to the actual secret. (N, e, g, h) . There is a set Λ of t+1 server indices. For all i ∈ Λ, Si holds additive dual-share (di, d i ), with corresponding check share Di = g
Initial configuration: Parameters
Also, all servers Si with i ∈ Λ have performed a ZK-proof-setup protocol ZKsetup-RSA (N, e, g ) with all other servers.
For all i ∈ Λ, Si broadcasts
where m is the message to be signed, or more generally, the value to which the cryptographic function is being applied. 3. For all i ∈ Λ, Si performs a ZK-proof of knowledge ZKproof-DL-REP(N, e, m, g, h, Ei, Di) with all other servers. Recall that this is performed over a broadcast channel so all servers can check if the ZK-proof was performed correctly. 4. If a server detects that for some i ∈ Λ, Si fails to perform the ZK-proof correctly, that server broadcasts a message (Bad,i) and quits the protocol. Fig. 3 . 2sum-to-1sum
2sum-to-2poly
The goal of 2sum-to-2poly is to transform t + 1 additive dual-shares with their corresponding check shares (obtained from 2sum-to-2sum) into polynomial sharings of the same secrets. The idea is for each shareholder to perform an INT-(t, l)-US-VSS with its shares as the secrets, and then to sum the resulting polynomials. The protocol is given in Figure 4 1. Initial configuration: Parameters (N, e, g, h) . There is a set Λ of server indices. For all i ∈ Λ, Si holds additive dual-share (di, 
Fig. 4. 2sum-to-2poly
Note the following ranges: 
RSA Protocols
We now present protocols for threshold function application and proactive maintenance. Their security and robustness proofs are available from the authors [18] .
Threshold Function Application
The protocol is given in Figure 5 1. Initial configuration: INT-(t, l)-US-VSS (parameters: (N, e, g, h) ) with tdegree polynomials a() and a (). Also, each server maintains a list G of server indices for servers that have not misbehaved (i.e., they are considered good).
A message m needs to be signed. 2. A set Λ ⊆ G with |Λ| = t + 1 is chosen in some public way. 3. 2poly-to-2sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 2. 4. 2sum-to-2sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 2. 5. 2sum-to-1sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 2. If there is no misbehavior, the signature on m can be computed from the partial signatures generated in this step, along with the leftover shares. 6. All values created during the signing protocol for m are erased.
Fig. 5. Function Application Protocol
Proactive Maintenance
For proactive maintenance, we perform an update by running 2poly-to-2sum on the secret polynomials, followed by 2sum-to-2sum and 2sum-to-2poly. After 2sum-to-2poly, each server erases all previous share information, leaving just the new polynomial shares and verification shares. If there is misbehavior by any server, the procedure is restarted with new participants (here restarts do not introduce statistical biases and do not reduce the protocol's security). The protocol is given in Figure 6 , where the full Proactive RSA protocol is in Figure 7. N, e, g, h) (N, e, g, h) (using new commitment values) . This setup will be used for all proofs performed during the following operational period. 4. A set Λ ⊆ G with |Λ| = t + 1 is chosen in some public way. 5. 2poly-to-2sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 4. 6. 2sum-to-2sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 4. 7. 2sum-to-2poly is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 4. 8. All previous share information is erased. (N, e, g, h) . 3. Each server maintains a list G of server indices for servers that have not misbehaved (i.e., they are considered good). It also maintains public parameters: (N, e, g, h, x pub , l, t) and the verification shares of the INT-(t, l)-US-VSS polynomials a() and a () which have a(0) = x and a (0) = x . 4. When a message m needs to be signed, the servers agree on the public parameters, then the Function Application protocol is run. 5. When an update is scheduled to occur, the servers agree on the public parameters, then the Proactive Maintenance protocol is run.
Initial configuration: INT-(t, l)-US-VSS (parameters: (
a Recall that x pub is computed using only the public values N, e, L.
Fig. 7. Proactive Threshold Protocol
A Proofs
We use efficient ZK proofs of knowledge (POKs) derived from [20] and [5] . These are composed of combinations of Σ-protocols [4] (i.e., Schnorr-type proofs [31] ).
For each ZK proof that we need, we will have a separate "proof" protocol, but there will be a single "setup" protocol used for all ZK proofs. Say A wishes to prove knowledge of "X" to B. Then the setup protocol will consist of B making a commitment and proving that he can open it in a witness indistinguishable way [13] , and the proof protocol will consist of A proving to B either the knowledge of "X" or that A can open the commitment. (See [5] for details.) This construction allows the proof protocols to be run concurrently without any timing constraints, as long as they are run after all the setup protocols have completed. (For more on the problems encountered with concurrent ZK proofs see [26, 11, 12] .) The (RSA-based) ZK-proof-setup protocols are exactly the Σ-protocols for commitments over q-one-way-group-homomorphisms (q-OWGH), given in [5] . Recall the q-OWGH for an RSA system with parameters (N, e) is f (x) = x e mod N (with q = e in this case).
Let KE denote the "knowledge error" of a POK. We define ZKsetup-RSA A,B (N, e, g) as a protocol in which A generates a commitment C and engages B in a WH POK (KE = 1/e) 7 of (σ, σ ) (with σ ∈ Z e , σ ∈ Z * N ) where C ≡ g σ (σ ) e mod N . We define ZKproof-DL-REP A,B (N, e, m, g, h indistinguishable from an honest server to the adversary. We have to backtrack the simulation only if the adversary corrupts this special server (which is a polynomial probability implying expected poly-time simulation).
